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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2, et seq., and Rules 3
and 4, Utah R. App. P.
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issues Presented in The Appeal of Plaintiff (also hereinafter sometimes referred to
as "Bennett") as to The Law Firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough,
Christopher L, Burton, Sidney G. Baucom, and James S. Lowrie:
A.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the law firm of Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, Christopher L. Burton, Sidney G. Baucom, and James
S. Lowrie (hereinafter the "Jones Waldo Defendants" or "Defendants") because, after
four attempts, Plaintiff could not allege or even generally identify, much less show, what
the Defendants did by way of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty or breaches of
contract that caused Plaintiff any damage? (The Standard of Review is correctness of the
Ruling.)
B.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the action as to the Jones Waldo

Defendants based on the doctrine of issue preclusion and finality of judgments, in that
Plaintiff was not alleging an individual malpractice action against these Defendants, but
collaterally attacking a class action settlement approved by a federal court for fairness and
competence of counsel? (The Standard of Review is correctness of the Ruling.)
C.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress or abuse of process? (The Standard of Review is correctness of the
Ruling.)

D.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the action as to the Jones Waldo

Defendants for failure to state a claim for deceit or collusion, after four attempts?
(The Standard of Review is correctness of the Ruling.)
E.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the action as to Defendants Baucom and

Lowrie because the claims are barred on the face of the Complaint by the applicable
statute of limitations? (The Standard of Review is correctness of the Ruling.)
III.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

Statutes, rules and other authorities that are determinative include:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 states:
An action may be brought within four years: (1) upon a contract, obligation,
or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; . . . (3) for relief not
otherwise provided for by law.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) states:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief... shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief;....
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) states:
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in
the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) states:
. . . The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground
for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56,
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.
2

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
Bennett filed his original Complaint on December 30, 1994, rapidly followed with
an Amended Complaint on January 21, 1995. (R. 1-156) A Second Amended Complaint
was filed August 1, 1995; a Third Amended Complaint wasfiledFebruary 9, 1996; and,
the Fourth Amended Complaint was finally filed on July 7, 1998. (R. 381-582, 10431138)
The underlying basis of all of the Complaints the settlement of a class action by the
Jones Waldo Defendants, who represented a class of plaintiffs in a case that was pending
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. (R. 189, 1053 U
39) As is required for class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the proposed $6.5 million settlement came before the California Federal Court
for approval.
Bennett opposed settlement of the class action for the proposed $6.5 million and
stated his opposition at the fairness hearing. (R. 10691106, 1132, 1219) The Federal
Court thoroughly considered Bennett's objections as to fairness, determined the
settlement was fair, and, consequently, approved it. (R. 235-247, 1219-1221)
Bennett opted out of the class settlement on August 13, 1992. (R. 247) Bennett's
attorney/client relationship with the Jones Waldo Defendants terminated on that date.
(R. 1068 If 104)
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In May 1994, Bennett threatened to sue Jones Waldo, Burton, and Baucom in Utah
state court (R. 1070-1071fflf113-116), which was finally first filed, as previously noted,
on December 30, 1994. (R. 1-75)
The Jones Waldo Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint or stay the action in
their response to the original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint on
February 23, 1995. (R. 184-187) The Motion requested that the action and full briefing
on the Motion to Dismiss be stayed until a ruling had been obtained from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California as to the scope of the final
order relating to the class action. (R. 184-223)
In the class action, Bennett was subject to a Bar Order entered by United States
District Court Chief Judge Judith N. Keep. (R. 202-209) The Bar Order enjoined and
restrained Bennett from challenging the sufficiency or fairness of the class action
settlement, the competency of class counsel, the award of fees and costs, and the award of
additional compensation to any of the named plaintiffs in the class action. (Id.) The Bar
Order did not bar or restrain Bennett from pursuing solely his own individual claims, to
the extent he had any, as to the Jones Waldo Defendants, at any time. (Id.)
On June 27, 1995, Plaintiff filed notice of his intent to file a Second Amended
Complaint on August 1, 1995. (R. 361-362) There was no objection to the filing of the
Second Amended Complaint by the Jones Waldo Defendants.
The federal Bar Order was subjected to two appeals to the Ninth Circuit. (R. 682,
685, 890-893) During that period of time it was recognized by the Federal Court and in
4

the court below in this action that the Bar Order did not prohibit Bennett from pursuing
his own claims for malpractice. In fact, a Third Amended Complaint was filed in this
case while the Bar Order was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. (R. 528-582) In a decision
dated June 19, 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the Bar Order did not preclude Bennett's
claims for malpractice (a fact already recognized), and that a Utah court may examine the
class settlement, but only insofar as it sheds light on the law firm's representation of
Bennett individually. (R. 890-893) The Ninth Circuit did not invalidate or otherwise
restrict the scope of the original Bar Order, nor did it disturb the original Bar Order's
findings that the class action settlement was fair and in the best interests of the class, and
that counsel for the class provided highly competent representation through the pendency
of the class action. (Id.)
After the decision was handed down from the Ninth Circuit, Bennett filed his
Fourth Amended Complaint on July 7, 1998. (R. 1043-1138) Defendants Baucom and
Lowrie were added as defendants (only the law firm and Burton were initially named) for
the first time in the Fourth Amended Complaint. (R. 1043)
The Jones Waldo Defendants then renewed their Motion to Dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 1149-1253) The Jones Waldo Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss was argued before the court below on October 25, 1999. (R. 1844) After
hearing oral argument, the court took the Jones Waldo Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
under advisement. (Id.) The court issued its Minute Entry dated February 11, 2000,
granting the Jones Waldo Defendants' Motion based upon all of the analytical points and
5

authorities set forth in the memoranda filed in support of the Jones Waldo Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and upon the points raised in oral argument. (R. 1882-1883)
Due to a clerical error, the Minute Entry was not sent to counsel for the Jones
Waldo Defendants. After discovery of the Minute Entry, an Order was prepared and an
Order of Dismissal With Prejudice as to the Jones Waldo Defendants was entered by the
court below on October 6, 2000. (R. 1969-1971)
On October 31, 2000, a Notice of Appeal was filed by Bennett from the October 6,
2000 Order dismissing the Jones Waldo Defendants. (R. 2000-2002) The appeal was
dismissed by the Utah Supreme Court on February 21, 2001, because there had been no
final order entered, in that the Judgment dismissing the other defendants, known as the
Post Kirby Defendants, had not been finalized.
On February 28, 2001, Judge Medley filed an order denying all outstanding
motions relating to post-trial motions of the Post Kirby Defendants.
On March 27, 2001, a Notice of Appeal was filed appealing the October 6, 2000
Order as to the Jones Waldo Defendants.

V. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
This denominated legal malpractice case arises out of another action filed by
Plaintiff, among others, entitled David D. Bennett, etal v. Thomas H. Bologna, etaL,
90-1183 (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Bennett v. Gen-Probe " or "Gen-Probe "),
a class action lawsuit that was pending in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Federal Court").
6

In that case, the law firm, Burton, Baucom, but not Lowrie, entered an appearance on
behalf of the class.
Stripped of rhetoric, hyperbole and hysteria, this case was nothing more than
Bennett's tortured complaint that the class action lawsuit, though governed by elaborate
rules, and subjected to intense judicial review and scrutiny, was not run exactly the way
he wanted it to be run. The Statement of Facts is as follows:
1.

After two years of complex, intense litigation, on December 18, 1991,

counsel for the class were authorized by two of the named Plaintiffs to offer to settle the
class action in exchange for a $6.5 million settlement fund. (R. 191, 1215) As is required
for class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the proposed
settlement came before the Federal Court for approval. In the Ninth Circuit, a proposed
class action settlement may not be approved unless the court finds both:
a.

That the settlement is fair and in the best interest of the class; and

b.

That counsel for the class have adequately represented the class

during the pendency of the case. (R. 191, 1154)
2.

Although the Federal Court, without reservation, enthusiastically found

both that the settlement was fair, and that counsel adequately represented the class, (R.
1193-1196), Bennett has, nevertheless, intentionally set out on a course of unrelenting
harassment and prosecution of Defendants that had gone on for seven years. (R. 1154)
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3.

Bennett opposed settlement of the class action for the proposed $6.5 million

fund, claiming that class counsel "manipulated" the settlement and "undermined" the
case. Bennett also opted out of the class action. (R. 1252)
4.

The Federal Court thoroughly considered Bennett's complaints, determined

that the settlement was fair, and consequently approved it. (R. 1181-1198) As a predicate
to finding the settlement to be fair, the Federal Magistrate Judge, the Honorable Louisa S.
Porter, stated:
As relates to the lawyers who recommended the settlement being
competent, experienced and not the subject of influence by the opposing
party, I must state that I felt that the attorneys involved in this case, both on
the Plaintiffs' and the Defense side were the finest attorneys I have seen,
the most ethical attorneys I have seen, and certainly experienced in this
area.
I was most impressed with the handling of this matter and the fact that each
of the attorneys appeared very concerned about each and all of the class
members and the class as a whole.
I felt that the attorneys were most professional in the face of what I believed
to be difficult issues, difficult clients, both Plaintiffs and Defendants, and
insurance carriers.
I cannot image any member of this class criticizing any of the attorneys in
this action. I feel that these attorneys did represent their clients
appropriately and ethically and acted exemplary throughout the settlement
negotiations in this case.
(R. 1195)
5.

Significantly, neither Bennett nor any other class plaintiff appealed Judge

Porter's approval of the class settlement or her determination that class counsel provided
competent representation. (R. 298)
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6.

As indicated above, Bennett opted out of the class action settlement on

August 13, 1992. (R.247)
7.

Bennett's attorney/client relationship with any of these Defendants

terminated as of August 13, 1992. (R. 1068 ^ 104)
8.

In late 1991, according to the allegations of the Fourth Amended

Complaint, Bennett began to express his discontent with class counsel, including the
Jones Waldo Defendants. (R. 1066 If 89)
9.

In May 1994, Bennett threatened to bring his own class action in Utah State

court against the Jones Waldo Defendants and a copy of a draft Complaint was shown to
Baucom. (R. 293, 299, 1070-1071ffl[113-116)
10.

The draft Complaint was perceived as nothing more than a collateral attack

on the fairness of the settlement and the competence of counsel previously adjudicated.
(R. 288-310)
11.

Counsel thus obtained a Bar Order from the Federal Court prohibiting the

Plaintiff from initiating or maintaining any lawsuit against Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough and its attorneys (including Christopher L. Burton and Sidney G. Baucom)
or any other class counsel which in any way involves:
a.

The sufficiency or fairness of the class action settlement in the

above-entitled action;
b.

The competency of class counsel and counsel's legal service on

behalf of the class in the above-entitled action;
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c.

The award of fees and costs to class counsel from the class action

settlement fund;
d.

The award of additional compensation to any of the named plaintiffs.

(R. 202-204)
12.

That Bar Order was first entered temporarily on July 5, 1994, and made

permanent on October 3, 1994. (R. 202-204, 208-209)
13.

Bennett also attacked certain of these Defendants before the Utah State Bar

by filing a complaint on February 1, 1993. (R. 1206- 1235) After a thorough
investigation, in a 28-page summary dismissal of complaint, the Utah State Bar special
counsel noted:
The complainant in this case is David D. Bennett ("Bennett"), one of nine
named plaintiffs in a class action entitled Bennett v. Gen-Probe. The
principal targets of the complaint are Christopher L. Burton and James W.
Peters of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough ("Jones Waldo"), lead
counsel for the plaintiffs in the Gen-Probe litigation....
The driving force behind Bennett's complaint is his dissatisfaction with the
settlement of the Gen-Probe litigation. The settlement was negotiated by
Burton and Peters, approved by seven of Bennett's co-plaintiffs and found
by the court to be reasonable and fair to all members of the plaintiff class.
Bennett contends that the settlement was reached without his permission
and without a full investigation or understanding of the value of the
plaintiffs' claims. He contends that his attorneys were interested only in
obtaining what the defendants would pay without a fight, so they could
collect their contingency fee with a minimum of risk and effort.
For the reasons set forth below, / have determined that this complaint is
unsupported by fact and does not raise the possibility of unprofessional
conduct.
(R. 1206-1207 (emphasis added))
10

14.

Bennett raised the same complaints before the Bar that he raised in the court

below, including unauthorized dismissal of claims and settlement, competence of counsel,
coercion, and deceit. (R. 1206, 1221, 1226, 1229, 1231)
15.

Special Counsel to the Bar concluded:

I have addressed all of the claims which Bennett appears to seriously assert
in his complaint. / have determined that all such claims are unsupported by
fact and do not raise the possibility of unprofessional conduct. I find that
any other claims contained in the voluminous materials Bennett submitted
to the Bar are so insubstantial as to merit no discussion in this decision.

Based upon the foregoing reasons, the complaint filed by David Bennett in
this matter, including all claims alleged therein, is summarily dismissed as
to all parties mentioned in the complaint. These parties specifically include,
but are not limited to, Christopher Burton, James Peters . . . . Pursuant to
Rule 10(a)(6) of The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, Bennett
may appeal this decision to the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline
Committee of the Utah State Bar within 15 days of the date of this decision.
(R. 1232-1233)
16.

Thus, by October 1994, Bennett's claims against the Jones Waldo

Defendants had been rejected as unmeritorious by both the California Federal Court and
the Utah State Bar. (R. 1181-1198, 1206-1235) Bennett and his lawyers, however, were
not deterred.
17.

Bennett filed his original Complaint in this Court on December 30, 1994,

and rapidly followed with his Amended Complaint on January 21, 1995. (R. 1-156)
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18.

A Second Amended Complaint was filed August 1, 1995; a Third Amended

Complaint was filed February 9, 1996; and, the Fourth Amended Complaint was finally
filed on July 7, 1998. (R. 381-582, 1043-1138)
19.

When Bennett filed his First Amended Complaint, Defendants moved the

California Federal Court to hold him in contempt for violating the Bar Order. In a
hearing on May 1, 1995, Chief Judge Keep, who issued the Bar Order, ordered Bennett to
amend his Utah Complaint by redacting all allegations relating to the class action
settlement and the competency of class counsel's representation. Judge Keep instructed:
[Bennett's] own little malpractice complaint is his and his alone. He has
absolutely no legal right to challenge the settlement, the class settlement in
this action, or in any way to pursue that. He is not a class representative.
The settlement in this case ... is collateral estoppel.

He can't bring class claims on behalf of himself. He can bring allegations
for malpractice and rely on things that happened during the course of that
case to himself if he feels it's appropriate.
(R. 774, 776, 778)
20.

After Bennett filed his Second Amended Complaint, Defendants again

moved the California Federal Court to hold Bennett in contempt of the Bar Order. On
January 11, 1996, Chief Judge Keep declared Bennett and his counsel in contempt and
ordered Bennett again to amend his Utah Complaint to delete claims concerning the class
settlement and the competency of class counsel. (R. 892)
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21.

Bennett appealed Judge Keep's orders to the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals. On June 19, 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the Bar Order did not preclude
Bennett's claims for malpractice, and that a Utah court may examine the class settlement,
but only insofar as it sheds light on the law firm's representation of Bennett individually.
(R. 890-892) The court also held that Bennett's allegations concerning the adequacy of
the class settlement should be construed, to the extent possible, as pertaining only to the
representation Bennett himself received. (R. 891) The court did not acknowledge that
Bennett's malpractice claims were valid, but simply stated he was not barred from trying
to allege individual actions to the extent possible. (R. 890-892)
22.

More importantly, the Ninth Circuit did not invalidate or otherwise restrict

the scope of the Bar Order, nor did it disturb Judge Porter's findings that (1) the class
action settlement was fair and in the best interests of the class, and (2) counsel for the
class provided highly competent representation throughout the pendency of the class
action. These findings remained valid and controlling. (R. 890-892, 1193-1197)
23.

Bennett eventually filed his Fourth Amended Complaint, and Defendants

again moved to have the action dismissed. (R. 1043-1138, 1149-1253)
24.

The court below dismissed the Fourth Amended Complaint on the points

raised by the Jones Waldo Defendants in their memoranda and in oral argument. (R.
1882-1883, 1969-1971)
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A summary of the arguments is listed in the following bullet points:
13

•

Nowhere in the Complaint is there a statement or fact pled as to how
Bennett was injured by any alleged act of malpractice by the Jones Waldo
Defendants.

•

The Fourth Amended Complaint is nothing more than a collateral attack of
the Federal Court's approval of the class action settlement as (a) fair, and
(b) in the best interests of the class.

•

Bennett opted out of the class and thus preserved his rights to pursue his
own claims. Although he did not pursue such rights, he was not impeded
by the class settlement because he opted out of the class.

•

As to Baucom and Lowrie, the statute of limitations had run because they
were first named as defendants only when the Fourth Amended Complaint
was filed on July 7, 1998, over four years after Bennett first threatened to
sue the other Jones Waldo Defendants, and over six years after the alleged
malpractice occurred, namely the settlement of the class action on
December 18, 1991.

•

The claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress or abuse of process
and the claim of deceit or collusion did not state a claim based on the facts
pleaded.

•

The court adequately set forth the basis of its ruling.
VII. ARGUMENT
POINT I

Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint failed to show what these
Defendants did wrong that caused Bennett damage.
The allegations in support of Plaintiff s Fourth Amended Complaint, even when
taken as true, were fatally deficient; they averred no facts showing that what these
Defendants allegedly did by way of malpractice actually and proximately caused Plaintiff
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any damage.1 As a result, Plaintiffs claims of breaches of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, and legal malpractice failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted.
Therefore, dismissal was clearly appropriate. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding,
909 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Utah App. 1996) ("the alleged wrong of the attorney must
proximately cause the client's injury ... [T]he same standard of causation applies whether
the alleged wrong is a negligent act, a fiduciary breach, or even a contractual breach").
Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states that "[a] pleading which sets forth
a claim for relief... shall contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Such a statement was lacking in the Complaint, and for good
reason: Plaintiff could not show a causal connection between what transpired between the
parties and any injuries allegedly incurred. See Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439
(Utah 1996) (stating that in a legal malpractice action the plaintiff must plead facts
demonstrating a causal connection between a breach of duty and the resulting injury, and
actual damages).

1

Plaintiffs First Cause of Action, purporting to state a claim for breaches of
contract, is based on the same duties imposed by law upon the attorney/client relationship.
Because the duties are not derived independently from the contract, but are the same as
those upon which Plaintiff bases his claims for breach of fiduciary duty and legal
malpractice, the First and Second Causes of Action should be treated together. See, e.g.,
Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 716 P.2d 575, 578 (Kan. 1986) (where essence of claim
is breach of duty imposed by law on attorney/client relationship, and not of contract itself,
the action is in tort). In any event, the same standard of causation applies to legal
malpractice actions whether based on negligence, fiduciary duly, or contract. See
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Utah App. 1996).
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In Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988), the court explained that
relief is granted in attorney malpractice actions only for those damages, actually incurred,
that are directly and proximately caused by the attorney's conduct. Even if duty and
breach of duty are established, a claim for relief fails absent a sufficient showing of actual
and proximate cause. See id.; see also Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1291 (noting that in legal
malpractice action, plaintiff "must establish actual cause-that but for the attorney's
wrong their loss would not have occurred—and proximate cause—that a reasonable
likelihood exists that they would have ultimately benefitted").
Here, Plaintiff opted out of the class action settlement, as he was entitled to do if
he did not believe the settlement was adequate. Having opted out, Plaintiffs claims
against the Gen-Probe defendants were not affected by the settlement, and he was free to
pursue those claims on his own.2 Plaintiff alleged nothing that suggests Defendants'
conduct precluded him from doing so, nor could he so allege.3 There was no causal

2

Given that Plaintiff opted out, he had no standing to complain about the
settlement. Plaintiffs Complaint, in effect, alleged that someone else's settlement was
unfair and coerced.
3

Bennett cannot establish that his interests were compromised during the period of
time he was a member of the class. Commencement of the class action tolled the
applicable statute of limitations for Bennett until he elected to opt out of the action. See
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350-52 (1983); Realmonte v. Reeves,
169 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999); Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1488
(9th Cir. 1985); cf. American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 762
(Utah 1992). Therefore, Bennett had the same rights to bring an individual action after he
opted out as he had before the class action was filed and he cannot establish that the Jones
Waldo Defendants' conduct caused him to suffer injury.
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connection between Plaintiffs failure to pursue his own claims after opting out of the
class and Defendants' representation of the class action. The Complaint failed to show
that but for Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff would have brought his own separate action
concerning the Gen-Probe merger and recovered what he considered a proper measure of
damages.
Plaintiffs sole statement of causation was, "[t]hese breaches and malpractice
proximately caused plaintiff to suffer damages and lost benefits." (R. 1085 f 178)
Plaintiff did not explain how the alleged malpractice caused him to suffer damages and
lost benefits, nor did he allege facts from which such inferences could reasonably be
made. He merely recited one boilerplate, conclusory sentence concerning causation.
This, as a matter of law, was insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See Birchfield
v. Harrod, 640 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Okla. App. 1982) (dismissing legal malpractice action
for failure to state a claim where pleading depended on conclusions of law without
properly alleging factual basis of causation).
In short, Plaintiff had not alleged a, prima facie case for legal malpractice. The
elements of causation and actual damage were conspicuously missing. Extensive
research has not uncovered a single case where a former class member, after opting out of
a class settlement, sued class counsel for legal malpractice. Equally wanting were any
cases where a former class member was allowed to sue class counsel for malpractice after
the class settlement was approved by the court. The point is striking: in such cases there
is no causation or actual injury as a matter of law.
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POINT II
Plaintiffs entire Complaint was an improper collateral attack on the Federal
Court's rulings and was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.
Of all rulings that should be given preclusive effect, those involved in a class
action lawsuit are the most deserving. Under federal rules and practice, class action suits
are subject to intense judicial scrutiny and are painstakingly reviewed for fairness. Courts
will not approve class action settlements unless, after first investigating any and all
objections thereto, they determine the settlement to be fair, adequate, and reasonable. See
Moore's Federal Practice §§ 23.80, 23.85[5][a] (1998).
Reduced to their essence, Plaintiffs causes of actions all concern alleged flaws,
both procedural and substantive, in the class action settlement agreement approved by the
Federal Court in California. In the Amended Complaints, Plaintiffs underlying claims
remained the same: he sought damages based on allegations that the settlement of the
class action was unfair and coerced, and that class counsel's purported misconduct and
incompetence resulted in the allegedly unfair settlement. These allegations were
improper.
Prior to approving the settlement agreement, The Honorable Louisa S. Porter
thoroughly considered all of Bennett's objections and allegations—which are repeated
virtually verbatim in the Fourth Amended Complaint-and found (1) that the settlement
was fair and in the best interest of the class, and (2) that counsel for the class had more
than adequately represented the class. Magistrate Judge Porter stated:
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. . . I felt that the attorneys involved in this case, both on the Plaintiffs' and
the Defense side were the finest attorneys I have seen, the most ethical
attorneys I have seen, and certainly experienced in this area.
I was most impressed with the handling of this matter and the fact that each
of the attorneys appeared very concerned about each and all of the class
members and the class as a whole.
I felt that the attorneys were most professional in the face of what I believed
to be difficult issues, difficult clients, both Plaintiffs and Defendants, and
insurance carriers.
I cannot image any member of this class criticizing any of the attorneys in
this action. I feel that these attorneys did represent their clients
appropriately and ethically and acted exemplary throughout the settlement
negotiations in this case.
(R. 1195)
In accordance with these findings, Chief Judge Keep later issued a Bar Order
prohibiting Plaintiff from suing Defendants in any way involving the fairness of the class
settlement or the competency of class counsel's representation. The Ninth Circuit's
ruling did not in any way overturn Judge Porter's findings or weaken the Bar Order issued
by Judge Keep. Both remain valid, and Plaintiff was precluded from making
contradictory allegations.
Significantly, Plaintiff did not appeal Judge Porter's findings that the settlement
was fair and that class counsel acted competently. He simply lodged objections to the
settlement and then opted out of the class. He nonetheless asked the court below to
overrule Judge Porter's findings despite the fact that the court below was not privy to the
numerous proceedings upon which her assessments were based. To do so would amount
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to an improper collateral attack on Judge Porter's findings, and a violation of the Bar
Order.
In addition to the Bar Order, the doctrine of issue preclusion/collateral estoppel
barred Plaintiff from relitigating the fairness of the class settlement and the competency
of representation provided by class counsel. The Utah Supreme Court recently held that,
in legal malpractice actions, the doctrine of issue preclusion appropriately bars relitigation
of certain issues already adjudicated in the underlying case. See Harline, 912 P.2d at
442-43. The court instructed that issue preclusion applies if four requirements are met:
First, the issues in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must
be final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully,
fairly, and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is
precluded from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action
or a privy of a party.
Id (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988)).
These requirements were fully satisfied in this case. The issues are the same: the
objections Bennett submitted to the Federal Court included, among others, that the
settlement amount was insufficient, that the settlement was manipulated, that the case was
undermined by the conduct of plaintiffs' attorneys, that there was inadequate
representation by plaintiffs' attorneys, and that there was improper pressure and
intimidation to settle. (R. 1132, 1181-1198) These are the same claims, as shown below,
are repeated throughout the Complaint.
Judge Porter's rulings were also final with respect to the issues raised. Once Judge
Porter found the settlement agreement fair and reasonable, determined that counsel had
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adequately represented the parties, and approved the settlement agreement, the class
action suit came to a close. Judge Porter had no reason to revisit those issues. Based on
the settlement agreement, final judgment was then entered.
The issues Plaintiff raised in the court below were also fully, fairly, and
competently litigated in the California Federal Court. As explained, courts thoroughly
investigate objections to class action settlements, and Judge Porter fulfilled that
obligation here. In addition, not only was Bennett given adequate opportunity to present
his objections to the settlement, but he had every incentive to do so fully, fairly, and
vigorously. Bennett was apparently just as convinced then as he is now that the
settlement amount was not fair. He also stood to benefit personally by advocating for an
increased settlement figure. Bennett alleged nothing that suggests the issues he raised
before Judge Porter were not fully advocated at that time.
Finally, Bennett was not just a party to the California proceedings, but was in fact
a named plaintiff and class representative. It was entirely appropriate to prevent him from
resurrecting in the court below the same issues and inflamed rhetoric he levied in the
Federal Court. The elements of issue preclusion are thus satisfied, and Plaintiffs entire
Complaint was properly dismissed on that ground as well.
That the Fourth Amended Complaint was yet another attempt to litigate the
fairness of the class settlement and the adequacy of class counsel's representation is best
illustrated by taking examples from the Complaint.

21

For instance, in accordance with Judge Porter's findings, the Bar Order enjoined
Bennett from attacking the sufficiency or fairness of the class action settlement. Despite
this, the Complaint alleged that the Gen-Probe case was in reality worth $50 million to
$100 million (R. 1053 ^f 40); that "Defendants initiated and pursued a misleading scheme
to settle the Gen-Probe case" (R. 1059 f 69); that the named plaintiffs would not have
agreed to a settlement below $10 million (R. 1059-1060 f 70(a)); that the settlement
should have been based on a "price per share basis, not upon a gross amount" (R. 1060
Tf 70(b)); that an immediate settlement of the class action was improper (R. 1061 Tf 70(e));
that the settlement conditions were improper (R. 1061-1062 If 71); that the settlement
amount was inadequate and there should have been an independent professional valuation
(R. 1062 Tf 74(a)); that "[t]he settlement figure was a mere 3.25% of the figure Jones
Waldo lawyers had formally pleaded" (R. 1062-1063 Tf 74(b)); that the settlement
"damages were inadequate" and the settlement was improperly negotiated (R. 1068
T[ 100); that "defendant lawyers ... committed malpractice by negotiating a settlement
which eliminated many original class members ... at the expense of the originally defined
minority public shareholders" (R. 1084 Tf 176); and, that Defendants knew the case was
worth more than the settlement amount (R. 1090 ^f 199(b)). These allegations do not form
the basis of an individual malpractice claim, rather they attack the sufficiency and fairness
of the class action settlement.
Similarly, despite Judge Porter's finding that class counsel competently
represented the class, and the Bar Order's ban on challenging class counsel's
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representation of the class, Plaintiff nonetheless made the following allegations: that
Defendants were deficient in resisting a change of venue motion in the class action suit
(R. 1055-1056fflj50-56); that Defendants were "grossly negligent" in dismissing GenProbe as a party defendant (R. 1057-1058fflf58-61, 10801f 160); that Defendants
committed malpractice in dismissing the derivative claims against directors of Gen-Probe
(R. 1058-1059 TI1164-68, 1080-1081 f 161); that Defendants encouraged settlement of the
class action for their own benefit and without regard for the effects on Bennett and other
class members (R. 1063fflj75-76); that Defendants did not work in the best interests of
Bennett and other class members (R. 1066 Tf 89); that Defendants failed to prosecute the
class action, "did not look towards 'trial of the lawsuit,'" and concentrated only on
settling the case (R. 1080 Tf 159); that Defendants committed malpractice by not obtaining
an independent valuation of the class action claims (R. 1082-1083 % 169); and, that
Defendants committed malpractice in their negotiations of the class action settlement
(R. 1084 ^ 176). Again, these allegations attacked the adequacy of the representation
provided by class counsel. Plaintiff failed to make distinct allegations of malpractice as
to him individually. His claims were therefore precluded as a matter of law.
Simply put, class counsel could not be held liable in this Court for a settlement
which the Federal Court approved as fair or for representation which the Federal Court
deemed competent. See Golden v. Pacific Maritime Ass yn, 786 F.2d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir.
1986) (applying doctrine of collateral estoppel to enjoin state malpractice and fraud action
against attorney brought by former clients who were named plaintiffs in federal class
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action suit). Plaintiffs Complaint, stripped of all allegations forbidden by the Bar Order
and precluded by Judge Porter's findings, stood bare of any actionable claims for relief.
POINT HI
Plaintiffs third cause of action fails to state a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress or abuse of process.
To make out a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a
plaintiff must allege facts showing the following elements: (1) extreme, outrageous and
intolerable conduct that offends generally accepted standards of decency and morality, (2)
defendants' intent to cause, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, severe
emotional distress, (3) plaintiffs actual severe emotional distress, and (4) actual and
proximate causation between the tortious conduct and the severe emotional distress. See
Retherfordv. AT&TComms., 844 P.2d 949, 970-71 (Utah 1992).
When allegations are insufficient to support these elements, Utah courts routinely
dismiss claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law. Seet e.g.,
Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025, 1028-29 (Utah 1987) (affirming dismissal of
action on grounds that allegations failed to state claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress). Absent factual allegations of actions so "outrageous and intolerable
that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality,"
judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317-18
(Utah App. 1990) (holding allegations failed to show any behavior approaching
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demanding standard of outrageousness to support claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
Here, Plaintiffs allegations failed to identify any conduct by Defendants that
approaches the requisite level of outrageousness. At most, Plaintiffs allegations show
that Defendants, who no longer had an attorney/client relationship with Plaintiff, took
measures to prevent him from attacking the class action settlement he opted out of and to
avoid an unfounded lawsuit against them. Even when construed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, nothing in the Complaint alleges conduct remotely near the level of
outrageousness necessary to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 P.2d 1382, 1388-89 (Utah App. 1995)
(upholding summary judgment on ground that facts alleged did not rise to level of
outrageousness necessary to establish prima facie case of intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
Plaintiff also failed to allege any facts indicating Defendants specifically intended
to cause him severe emotional distress. Plaintiffs conclusory statement that Defendants'
actions were taken for the purpose of inflicting emotional distress upon him, without any
supporting facts, is insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. (R. 1088 % 192)
Finally, while the Complaint stated Plaintiff felt anxiety and pressure as a result of
Defendant's actions, it did not allege the severity of emotional distress required to sustain
this cause of action. Although the Fourth Amended Complaint averred Plaintiff was
anxious about damage to his reputation and career, feared incarceration by Judge Keep,
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feared potential financial consequences, and felt financial pressure, (R. 1088 f 193),
notably, these stresses were largely brought about by Plaintiffs own conduct in filing
claims prohibited by the Bar Order and in continuing to attack the class settlement after
opting out of it. See Graf v. Don Rasmussen Co., 592 P.2d 250, 256 (Or. App. 1979)
(upholding dismissal of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress where
complaint failed to plead facts showing plaintiffs distress arose from negligence of
defendant). To the extent these stresses were caused by Defendants, if at all, they simply
did not entail the requisite severity of emotional distress. See Retherford, 844 P.2d at 976
n.17 (explaining that plaintiff must have actually experienced severe emotional anguish
because of defendants' objectively outrageous conduct); see also Sperber, 1M P.2d at
1029 (noting that emotional anguish one normally incurs in pursuing grievance
procedures for discharge from employment does not support claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067
(Mont. 1982) (holding that being disturbed and in shock is insufficient to recover for
emotional distress).
Plaintiff thus failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The Complaint, even when construed in Plaintiffs favor, did not allege
outrageous conduct, did not allege facts showing Defendants intended to cause and did
cause severe emotional distress, and did not allege the necessary degree of emotional
suffering to support this cause of action.
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Plaintiffs claim for abuse of process was equally inept. The tort of abuse of
process requires a showing the Defendants used a legal process against the Plaintiff
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed. See Gilbert v. Ince, 981
P.2d 841 (Utah 1999); Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 519 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1974).
"The usual case of abuse of process is one of some form of extortion."

Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 682 comment b (2000). There is no action for abuse of process when
there is only an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the
defendant. See id.
In Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F.Supp. 1563, 1572 (D. Utah 1995), the
court noted that, under Utah law, "even a pure spite motive is not sufficient [to state a
claim for abuse of process] where process is used only to accomplish the result for which
it was created." The Keller court continued, "there is no liability where the defendant has
done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though
with bad intention." Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton et al, Prosser andKeeton on the Law
of Torts § 121, at 897-98 (5th ed. 1984)).
Plaintiffs Complaints failed to allege any facts supporting an abuse of process
claim. Rather the allegations indicate Defendants sought the Bar Order to prevent
Plaintiff from undermining the class action settlement agreement or otherwise relitigating
the class action suit he abandoned. The Defendants simply petitioned the California
Federal Court to exercise its authority to enforce its own settlements, judgments, and
orders. In seeking an injunction, the Defendants used the judicial process to accomplish
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the result for which it was created. The Complaint identified nothing Defendants did that
was wrongful.
Moreover, Plaintiff had no standing to claim it was an abuse of process for
Defendants allegedly to have sought the Bar Order as "Attorneys for Plaintiffs" without
first discussing the order with the named plaintiffs. (R. 1086 f 184) By his own
allegations, Plaintiff had already opted out of the class at that time. (R. 1070 ^ 112, 10851086 TH| 182, 184) Plaintiff thus failed to state a legally cognizable claim for abuse of
process.4
POINT IV
Plaintiff failed to state a claim for deceit and collusion.
The Complaint did not allege facts that support a claim for deceit or collusion.
The statute upon which Plaintiff bases his Fourth Cause of Action, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-51-31, has been repealed. However, even if the law had not been repealed, the
lower court did not err in dismissing this claim.
At the time the lower court heard this claim, Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-31 read as
follows:
An attorney and counselor who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or who
consents thereto, with intent to deceive a court or judge or a party to an
4

To the extent any of Plaintiff s claims were based on statements by any of the
Defendants during the Bar Order proceedings, such claims would also fail. Defendants
were protected by the absolute privilege afforded statements or publications made in
judicial proceedings. See Cal. Civ. Code § 47 (Deering 1995); see also Allen v. Ortez,
802 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1990) (noting absolute privilege of litigants and counsel for
statements injudicial proceeding).
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action or proceeding is liable to be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured
party treble damages to be recovered in a civil action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-31 (1996). There are no case annotations or notes offering
guidance on what constituted deceit or collusion under this provision. The code compiler
for the deceit and collusion statute, however, references American Jurisprudence 2d
Attorneys at Law §§ 41 and 48. Those sections explain that attorneys may be disciplined,
i.e., suspended or disbarred, for gross misconduct showing them to be so lacking in
honesty or probity to be unfit to practice law. See Am. Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 41
(1997). They also explain that disciplinary action is warranted for improper ex-parte
communications with a judge. See id. § 48.
Plaintiff already filed such allegations concerning Defendants9 conduct in the class
action with the Utah State Bar. The Bar thoroughly investigated Plaintiffs claims and
summarily dismissed them as meritless. (R. 1206-1234) Plaintiff was not, and should not
have been, allowed to circumvent the Bar's determination that Defendants did not engage
in unethical or improper conduct by bringing an action under § 78-51-31.
In addition, case law from other jurisdictions with statutes identical to § 78-51-31
confirms that the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not amount to deceit and collusion under
the statute. For instance, in LaFountaine v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 698 P.2d 410, 413
(Mont. 1985), the court held an attorney in violation of a statute identical to
§ 78-51-31 where the attorney misrepresented to the court clerk that a default judgment
had been reinstated by an appellate court, and then procured from the clerk—instead of
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from a judge-a judgment based upon the fabricated default judgment without a hearing,
as normally required. The court trebled the costs incurred by the innocent party who
expended time and money to remedy the deceit. See also People v. Matalon, 400
N.Y.S.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (noting attorney violated deceit and collusion
statute by soliciting and procuring fees from indigent client whom attorney was supposed
to represent without charge).
None of the allegations in the Complaint resembles the type of conduct described
in the above cases. Plaintiffs claim for deceit or collusion was properly dismissed.
POINT V
The court below is not the proper forum for Plaintiff to complain of the Bar
Order proceedings in Federal Court.
Much of Plaintiff s allegations concern the Bar Order proceedings before
Magistrate Porter and Chief Judge Keep in the California Federal Court. This Court and
the court below lack jurisdiction over those complaints. Plaintiff should have brought his
alleged grievances before the appropriate federal channel of review.
Plaintiff dedicated numerous paragraphs about his complaints with the Bar Order
proceedings. (R. 1071-1074 TJt 118-133) Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that
Defendants sought the Bar Order without notifying him, that Magistrate Porter lacked
authority to issue the Order, and that the Order violated Plaintiffs rights to due process
and freedom of speech. These allegations, whether true or not, were not properly before
the court below. The court below had no appellate jurisdiction over proceedings in the
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California Federal Court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (Supp. 1998) (listing matters
over which Utah District Courts have jurisdiction).
POINT VI
All claims against Defendants Baucom and Lowrie were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs attempt to disguise this action as one sounding in contract, rather than
tort, does not prevent application of the correct statute of limitations. See, e.g., Funnell v.
Jones, 131 P.2d 105, 107 (Okla. 1985) (explaining that action for legal malpractice,
though based on contract for employment, is an action in tort and is governed by tort
statute of limitations).
Plaintiff asserted the pertinent statute is § 78-12-23(1), which provides a six-year
limitations period for actions based on written contracts. Plaintiffs action, however, was
one for legal malpractice, which, under Utah law, is governed by the four-year limitations
period provided in § 78-12-25. See Merkley v. Beaslin, 11% P.2d 16, 19 (Utah App.
1989); see also Werschky v. Moore, 706 P.2d 572, 574 (Or. App. 1985) (holding
plaintiffs purported claim for breach of contract was based on duties imposed on
defendant attorney independent of contract and was thus governed by limitations period
for legal malpractice claims). An action for legal malpractice accrues, and the four-year
period begins to run, when the act complained of is discovered or should have been
discovered. See Merkley, 778 P.2d at 19.
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In the court below, Plaintiff admitted he discovered the acts complained of in
August 1992, when Sidney Baucom wrote him a letter terminating the attorney/client
relationship. That letter was dated August 17, 1992, and terminated the relationship as of
August 13, 1992~the date Bennett opted out of the class action settlement. (R. 1068
Tf 104) At the latest, the statute of limitations began to run on August 17, 1992.
Plaintiff named Sidney Baucom and James Lowrie as defendants for the first time
in the Fourth Amended Complaint, which was filed July 7, 1998. Thus, the claims
against Baucom and Lowrie were, at the least, nearly two years outside the limitations
period. See Hansen v. Petrof Trading Co., 527 P.2d 116 (Utah 1974) (testing limitations
period from date claim should have been discovered to date claim was filed).
Plaintiff contends that § 78-12-41 tolled the statute of limitations on the claims
against Baucom and Lowrie during the period the "Bar Order" was in effect, from July 5,
1994, until August 4, 1997. (See R. 916, 1078 ^ 150) This argument is indeed curious:
Plaintiff himself did not consider his malpractice claims precluded by the Bar Order, as
evidenced by the fact he filed a Complaint in the court below on December 30, 1994,
against Jones Waldo and Christopher Burton, and had amended that Complaint several
times since. Plaintiff made no claims against Baucom or Lowrie until the Fourth
Amended Complaint.
Further, Chief Judge Keep, who issued the Bar Order, specifically stated that the
Bar Order did not prevent Plaintiff from filing claims such as those now alleged against
Baucom and Lowrie. In fact, in a hearing to determine whether Plaintiffs claims in Utah
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court violated her Bar Order, Judge Keep directed Plaintiff to amend the first Utah
Complaint to exclude class action claims, but specifically stated that "[h]e can bring
allegations for malpractice ... if he feels it's appropriate." (R. 776, 778) To hold the Bar
Order enjoined Plaintiffs claims against Baucom and Lowrie, and thus tolled the
limitations period on those claims, would be to contradict the explanation Judge Keep
gave of her own order to Plaintiff.5
Plaintiff also claimed the statute of limitations on the claims against Baucom and
Lowrie had been tolled since April 10, 1995, by virtue of the indefinite stay granted by
this Court on that date. (R. 1078 ^f 151) This argument fails for the same reasons stated
above: in no manner did this Court's stay or Judge Keep's Bar Order preclude Plaintiffs
claims for legal malpractice. In fact, Plaintiffs past conduct again contradicts the theory
he asserted in the court below: he freely amended the Complaint in this case several
times since imposition of the stay. Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on
August 1, 1995, and his Third Amended Complaint on February 9, 1996. As part of those
two amended pleadings Plaintiff could have—but fatal to the claims, did not—name
Baucom and Lowrie as defendants.
In sum, nothing prevented Plaintiff from amending his Complaints during the fouryear limitations period to include claims against Baucom and Lowrie. The statute of
limitations was not tolled, but ran continuously. As a matter of law, therefore, the
5

Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint detailed how Judge Keep repeatedly
directed Plaintiff to delete class actions claims, but never held the Bar Order prevented
him from pleading other claims, i.e., legal malpractice. (R. 1073-1076fflf131-143)
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limitations period expired long before Plaintiff attempted to name Baucom and Lowrie as
defendants. The claims against them were properly dismissed.
POINT VII
The lower court adequately set forth the basis of its ruling.
Plaintiffs attempts to criticize the lower court's ruling, based on Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a), fails. Rule 52(a) explains that a court is to "issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b)...
when the motion is based on more than one ground." (emphasis added). The lower court
did so, on February 11, 2000, in a Minute Entry, that stated in part:
After further review of all memoranda and all controlling authorities cited
by counsel, the Court rules as follows: 1. Jones Waldo's Motion To
Dismiss is granted based upon all of the analytical points and authorities set
forth in Jones Waldo's memoranda in support, reply, and oral argument.
(R. 1882-1883) (emphasis in original).6 Thus, the court expressly adopted each of the
legal grounds set forth by the Jones Waldo Defendants in their memoranda and during
oral argument. That does not violate Rule 52(a).

6

This is not a situation in which an overreaching party prepared a proposed order
for the court that set forth grounds beyond that which the court had expressly stated. The
order entered by the court below contained the same language as its Minute Entry.
Further, there can be no question that the court carefully reviewed the order, since before
entering the proposed order it added a hand-written sentence to the order. (R. 1969-1970)
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite amending his Complaint on four separate occasions, Plaintiff failed to
state claims upon which relief could be granted. The Order of Dismissal as to the Jones
Waldo Defendants should be affirmed.
DATED this 2 ^ day of November, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By £"£'
-6

R. Brent Stephens
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendants
Jones, Waldo Holbrook & McDonough;
Christopher L. Burton; Sidney G.
Baucom; and James S. Lowrie
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